893.03 Annotation Statute of limitations is not tolled by filing action in court completely lacking jurisdiction and later refiling in proper court after statute has run. Schafer v. Wegner, 78 W (2d) 127, 254 NW (2d) 193.
893.04 893.04 Computation of period within which action may be commenced. Unless otherwise specifically prescribed by law, a period of limitation within which an action may be commenced is computed from the time that the cause of action accrues until the action is commenced.
893.04 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.04 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: Previous section 893.48 is repealed and sections 893.04 and 893.14 created for the purpose of clarity. See Denzer v. Rouse, 48 Wis. 2d 528, 180 N.W. 2d 521 (1970) for a discussion of when a cause of action accrues, citing Holifield v. Setco Industries, Inc. 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W. 2d 177 (1969). [Bill 326-A]
893.04 Annotation In attorney malpractice actions as in medical malpractice cases where the date of negligence and the date of injury are the same, the statute of limitations runs from that date, for that is the time when the cause of action accrues. Denzer v. Rouse, 48 W (2d) 528, 180 NW (2d) 521.
893.04 Annotation The loss of the right to a patent is the loss of the right to exclude others and, therefore, the injury occurred on that date the right to a patent was lost. Boehm v. Wheeler, 65 W (2d) 668, 223 NW (2d) 536.
893.04 Annotation Because 67.11 requires moneys in sinking fund remain inviolate until bonds are retired, cause of action regarding fund could only accrue at retirement. Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. City of Chilton, 78 W (2d) 52, 253 NW (2d) 879.
893.04 Annotation Tort claim accrues when injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. Court adopts this "discovery rule" for all tort actions other than those already governed by statutory discovery rule. Hansen v. A. H. Robins, Inc. 113 W (2d) 550, 335 NW (2d) 578 (1983).
893.04 Annotation See note to 893.54, citing Borello v. U.S. Oil Co. 130 W (2d) 397, 388 NW (2d) 140 (1986).
893.04 Annotation The day upon which a cause of action accrues is not included in computing the period of limitation. Pufahl v. Williams, 179 W (2d) 104, 506 NW (2d) 747 (1993).
893.04 Annotation Computing time in tort statutes of limitation. Ghiardi, 64 MLR 575 (1981).
893.04 Annotation Computing Time. Ghiardi. Wis. Law. March 1993.
893.05 893.05 Relation of statute of limitations to right and remedy. When the period within which an action may be commenced on a Wisconsin cause of action has expired, the right is extinguished as well as the remedy.
893.05 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.05 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This new section is a codification of Wisconsin case law. See Maryland Casualty Company v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 14 N.W. 2d 177 (1944), in which it is stated at page 393: "In Wisconsin the running of the statute of limitations absolutely extinguishes the cause of action for in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as statutes of repose. The limitation of actions is a right as well as a remedy, extinguishing the right on one side and creating a right on the other, which is as of high dignity as regards judicial remedies as any other right and it is a right which enjoys constitutional protection". [Bill 326-A]
893.07 893.07 Application of foreign statutes of limitation.
893.07(1)(1) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign cause of action and the foreign period of limitation which applies has expired, no action may be maintained in this state.
893.07(2) (2) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign cause of action and the foreign period of limitation which applies to that action has not expired, but the applicable Wisconsin period of limitation has expired, no action may be maintained in this state.
893.07 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.07 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: Sub. (1) applies the provision of s. 893.05 that the running of a statute of limitations extinguishes the right as well as the remedy to a foreign cause of action on which an action is attempted to be brought in Wisconsin in a situation where the foreign period has expired. Sub. (1) changes the law of prior s. 893.205 (1), which provided that a resident of Wisconsin could sue in this state on a foreign cause of action to recover damages for injury to the person even if the foreign period of limitation had expired.
893.07 Annotation Sub. (2) applies the Wisconsin statute of limitations to a foreign cause of action if the Wisconsin period is shorter than the foreign period and the Wisconsin period has run. [Bill 326-A]
893.07 Annotation Borrowing statute properly applied to injury received without this state; conflict of laws analysis was not appropriate. Guertin v. Harbour Assur. Co. 141 W (2d) 622, 415 NW (2d) 831 (1987).
893.07 Annotation See note to 893.16, citing Scott v. First State Ins. Co. 155 W (2d) 608, 456 NW (2d) 312 (1990).
893.07 Annotation This section refers to periods of limitations, not periods of repose. Leverence v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty, 158 W (2d) 64, 462 NW (2d) 218 (Ct. App. 1990).
893.07 Annotation This section does not borrow foreign tolling statutes. Johnson v. Johnson, 179 W (2d) 574, 508 NW (2d) 19 (Ct. App. 1993).
893.07 Annotation Tort action based on injury received outside state was "foreign". Johnson v. Deltadynamics, Inc. 813 F (2d) 944 (7th Cir. 1987).
893.07 Annotation A tort action is foreign for purposes of this section when the injury giving rise to liability is incurred outside this state. Terranova v. Terranova, 883 F Supp. 1273 (1995).
893.07 Annotation Under this section, foreign jurisdiction's period of limitations is borrowed, but not its period of repose. Beard v. J. I. Case Co. 823 F (2d) 1095 (7th Cir. 1987).
893.07 Annotation Wisconsin's borrowing statute: Did we shortchange ourselves? 70 MLR 120 (1986).
subch. II of ch. 893 SUBCHAPTER II
LIMITATIONS TOLLED OR EXTENDED
893.10 893.10 Actions, time for commencing. The period within which an action may be commenced shall not be considered to have expired when the court before which the action is pending is satisfied that the person originally served knowingly gave false information to the officer with intent to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her duty in the service of any summons or civil process. If the court so finds, the period of limitation is extended for one year.
893.10 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.10 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.14 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.11 893.11 Extension of time if no person to sue. The fact that there is no person in existence who is authorized to bring an action on a cause of action at the time it accrues shall not extend the time within which, according to this chapter, an action may be commenced upon the cause of action to more than double the period otherwise prescribed by law.
893.11 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.11 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.50 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893 and revised for the purpose of textual clarity only. [Bill 326-A]
893.12 893.12 Advance payment of damages; limitation extended. The period fixed for the limitation for the commencement of actions, if a payment is made as described in s. 885.285 (1), shall be either the period of time remaining under the original statute of limitations or 3 years from the date of the last payment made under s. 885.285 (1), whichever is greater.
893.12 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.12 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is created to place the statute extending statute of limitations when there has been a settlement and advance payment of claim for damages into the subchapter of chapter 893 on extension of statute of limitations. The provisions of prior s. 885.285 (4) are contained without change in newly created s. 893.12. [Bill 326-A]
893.12 Annotation Property payment under 885.285 (1) extends limitation under 893.12, but only if made within 3-year limit of 893.54 (1). Abraham v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co. 115 W (2d) 678, 341 NW (2d) 414 (Ct. App. 1983).
893.12 Annotation Section does not apply to foreign cause of action; 893.07 (1) prevents 893.12 from extending foreign statutes of limitation. Thimm v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. 148 W (2d) 332, 434 NW (2d) 842 (Ct. App. 1988).
893.12 Annotation Tolling provision applies only to party that received settlement or advance payment under 885.285; it does not apply to stranger to settlement. Riley v. Doe, 152 W (2d) 766, 449 NW (2d) 83 (Ct. App. 1989).
893.12 Annotation For a period of limitations to be extended under this section as the result of a "payment" by check, the check must be accepted and negotiated. Parr v. Milwaukee Bldg. & Const. Trades, 177 W (2d) 140, 501 NW (2d) 858 (Ct. App. 1993).
893.12 Annotation To be a payment under s. 885.285 which will toll or extend the statute of limitations, a payment must be related to fault or liability. Gurney v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co. 188 W (2d) 68, 523 NW (2d) 193 (Ct. App. 1994).
893.13 893.13 Tolling of statutes of limitation.
893.13(1) (1) In this section and ss. 893.14 and 893.15 "final disposition" means the end of the period in which an appeal may be taken from a final order or judgment of the trial court, the end of the period within which an order for rehearing can be made in the highest appellate court to which an appeal is taken, or the final order or judgment of the court to which remand from an appellate court is made, whichever is latest.
893.13(2) (2) A law limiting the time for commencement of an action is tolled by the commencement of the action to enforce the cause of action to which the period of limitation applies. The law limiting the time for commencement of the action is tolled for the period from the commencement of the action until the final disposition of the action.
893.13(3) (3) If a period of limitation is tolled under sub. (2) by the commencement of an action and the time remaining after final disposition in which an action may be commenced is less than 30 days, the period within which the action may be commenced is extended to 30 days from the date of final disposition.
893.13 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.13 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: Section 893.35 is repealed and this section created to clarify the ending of the tolled period of a statute of limitations in the various situations which can arise when an appeal is taken.
893.13 Annotation Sub. (3) would apply when, for example, an action was commenced when the period of limitation has only 5 days left to run. The running of the period of limitation is tolled for the period from commencement of the action until the day of its final disposition, such as dismissal of the action based on the pleadings. A 30-day period is then provided (rather than the 5 days left on the original period of limitation) in order to provide a reasonable time for a party to consider whether to recommence the action. [Bill 326-A]
893.13 Annotation This section does not toll the statute to allow an independent claim by an insurer. It simply insures that the joinder of constituent parts of a cause of action, during the pendency of the action, is not frustrated by the application of the appropriate statute of limitations. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Owens, 191 W (2d) 745, 530 NW (2d) 51 (Ct. App. 1995).
893.13 Annotation The filing of an action subsequently voluntarily dismissed tolls the statute of limitations under sub. (2) for the period specified in sub. (1) for cases where no appeal is taken. Johnson v. County of Crawford, 195 W (2d) 374, 536 NW (2d) 167 (Ct. App. 1995).
893.13 Annotation Filing suit prior to expiration of 120-day period or denial of claim is not truly commenced and does not toll the statute of limitations when filed. Colby v. Columbia County, 202 W (2d) 342, 550 NW (2d) 124 (1996).
893.135 893.135 Tolling of statute of limitations for marital property agreements. Any statute of limitations applicable to an action to enforce a marital property agreement under ch. 766 is tolled as provided under s. 766.58 (13).
893.135 History History: 1985 a. 37; 1987 a. 393.
893.137 893.137 Tolling of statute of limitations for certain time-share actions. Any statute of limitations affecting the right of an association organized under s. 707.30 (2) or a time-share owner, as defined in s. 707.02 (31), against a developer, as defined in s. 707.02 (11), is tolled as provided in s. 707.34 (1) (bm).
893.137 History History: 1987 a. 399.
893.14 893.14 Limitation on use of a right of action as a defense or counterclaim. Unless otherwise specifically prescribed by law, the period within which a cause of action may be used as a defense or counterclaim is computed from the time of the accrual of the cause of action until the time that the plaintiff commences the action in which the defense or counterclaim is made. A law limiting the time for commencement of an action is tolled by the assertion of the defense or the commencement of the counterclaim until final disposition of the defense or counterclaim. If a period of limitation is tolled under this section and the time remaining after final disposition in which an action may be commenced is less than 30 days, the period within which the action may be commenced is extended to 30 days from the date of final disposition.
893.14 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.14 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is based upon previous ss. 893.48 and 893.49. The section provides, however, that a statute of limitations is tolled only from the assertion of the defense or counterclaim until the final disposition of the defense or counterclaim. Under previous s. 893.49 a statute of limitations was tolled from the commencement of the action in which the defense or counterclaim was asserted until the termination of the action. [Bill 326-A]
893.15 893.15 Effect of an action in a non-Wisconsin forum on a Wisconsin cause of action.
893.15(1) (1) In this section "a non-Wisconsin forum" means all courts, state and federal, in states other than this state and federal courts in this state.
893.15(2) (2) In a non-Wisconsin forum, the time of commencement or final disposition of an action is determined by the local law of the forum.
893.15(3) (3) A Wisconsin law limiting the time for commencement of an action on a Wisconsin cause of action is tolled from the period of commencement of the action in a non-Wisconsin forum until the time of its final disposition in that forum.
893.15(4) (4)Subsection (3) does not apply to an action commenced on a Wisconsin cause of action in a non-Wisconsin forum after the time when the action is barred by a law of the forum limiting the time for commencement of an action.
893.15(5) (5) If an action is commenced in a non-Wisconsin forum on a Wisconsin cause of action after the time when the Wisconsin period of limitation has expired but before the foreign period of limitation has expired, the action in the non-Wisconsin forum has no effect on the Wisconsin period of limitation.
893.15 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.15 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: Sub. (1) defines the term "a non-Wisconsin forum". "State" is defined in s. 990.01 (40) to include the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and territories of the United States.
893.15 Annotation Sub. (2) determines the commencement and termination of an action in a non-Wisconsin forum by the law of that forum. "Local law" is referred to so that the non-Wisconsin court determining the commencement of an action in, for example, Illinois will use Illinois law, not including any other law which an Illinois court might use under a choice of law theory.
893.15 Annotation Sub. (3) applies the tolling effect of Wisconsin statutes to actions on Wisconsin causes of action brought in federal courts in Wisconsin and to all other courts, state and federal, in the United States.
893.15 Annotation Sub. (4) prevents the commencement of an action in a forum whose statute of limitations has run from extending the Wisconsin tolling period.
893.15 Annotation Sub. (5) prevents the maintenance of an action in a non-Wisconsin forum from extending a Wisconsin statute of limitations. [Bill 326-A]
893.16 893.16 Person under disability.
893.16(1) (1) If a person entitled to bring an action is, at the time the cause of action accrues, either under the age of 18 years, except for actions against health care providers; or insane, or imprisoned on a criminal charge the action may be commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, except that where the disability is due to insanity or imprisonment, the period of limitation prescribed in this chapter may not be extended for more than 5 years.
893.16(2) (2)Subsection (1) does not shorten a period of limitation otherwise prescribed.
893.16(3) (3) A disability does not exist, for the purposes of this section, unless it existed when the cause of action accrues.
893.16(4) (4) When 2 or more disabilities coexist at the time the cause of action accrues, the 2-year period specified in sub. (1) does not begin until they all are removed.
893.16(5) (5) This section applies only to statutes in this chapter limiting the time for commencement of an action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim except it does not apply to:
893.16(5)(a) (a) Actions for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for escape;
893.16(5)(b) (b) Extend the time limited by s. 893.33, 893.41, 893.59, 893.62, 893.73 to 893.76, 893.77 (3), 893.86 or 893.91 or subch. VIII for commencement of an action or assertion of a defense or counterclaim; or
893.16(5)(c) (c) A cause of action which accrues prior to July 1, 1980.
893.16 History History: 1979 c. 323.
893.16 Note Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1979: This section is based on present ss. 893.135, 893.33, 893.37 and 893.38. Previous ss. 893.135 and 893.33 stated that the time of disability is not counted as the running of a statute of limitation and further stated that an action could be brought within a specified time after the disability ceased. This is inherently inconsistent and is replaced in s. 893.16 by the simple provision that the action may be commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases. Changes from previous s. 893.135 are:
893.16 Annotation (a) The period within which to sue after the period of disability ends is reduced from 5 years to 2 years.
893.16 Annotation (b) The maximum extension time available to those under disability of insanity or imprisonment is limited to 5 years. This means that such individuals must sue within 5 years after the basic applicable statute of limitations would have run against one not under disability, or within 2 years after the disability ends, whichever period is shorter.
893.16 Annotation (c) The phrase in previous s. 893.135, "at the time such title shall first descend or accrue" is changed to "at the time the cause of action accrues," and this is reinforced by subsection (3). Despite appearances, this represents no change in substance because of the decision in Swearingen v. Roberts, 39 Wis. 462 (1876).
893.16 Annotation Other changes include:
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